Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Electoral fraud and errors in consolidation of large-scale voting data are fundamental issues in democratic societies. To counteract issues with malicious manipulations and accidental errors in the counting of votes, most electoral systems allow for strategic recounting of ballots to verify the election outcome. Recounting is generally an expensive and high-stakes process, and it would be desirable to formalize the problem so as to capture the relevant trade-offs and possibly pursue an algorithmic approach to finding an optimal recounting strategy. Such a framework was recently proposed by Elkind et al. \[[@CR5]\], where the authors considered the problems of protecting and manipulating elections by recounting and changing ballots, respectively. These problems are modeled as a Stackelberg game involving an attacker and a defender. Both players work with limited budgets (say $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathcal {B}_D$$\end{document}$), and the question is if the players can develop optimal strategies for their desired outcomes.

In this model, the election is spread out across multiple districts, with the voter preferences aggregated according to the plurality voting rule in one of two different ways, which we will explain explicitly in a moment. The manipulation problem is the following. The attacker has to optimize, typically with the goal of turning the election in favor of a particular candidate that he may have in mind, an attack strategy that involves manipulating the votes in at most $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Known Results.* The results obtained in \[[@CR5]\] already demonstrate the hardness of the attacker's and defender's problems for two natural ways of aggregating the votes: (1) *Plurality over Voters* (PV), where districts are only used for the purpose of collecting the ballots and the winner is selected among the candidates that receive the largest number of votes in total, and (2) *Plurality over Districts* (PD), where each district selects a preferred candidate using the Plurality rule, and the overall winner is chosen among the candidates supported by the largest number of districts, or the set of districts with largest total weight if the districts have weights associated with them. We briefly recall the main highlights from \[[@CR5]\], since this provides the context for our contributions. It turns out that the recounting problem is NP-complete for both implementations of the plurality rule, even when there are only three candidates (this result assumes a succinct representation of the votes) or even when the votes are specified in unary. The problem is tractable when PD is employed over unweighted districts. On the other hand, the manipulation problem is NP-hard for PD even with unweighted districts, and in fact, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\Sigma _2^P$$\end{document}$-complete for PD with succinct input even when there are only three candidates. Further, it is NP-hard for PV, again even when there are only three candidates (in the setting of succinct input) or even when the votes are specified in unary.

*Our Contributions.* Our main contribution is to establish the parameterized intractability of both the recounting and manipulation problems under both implementations of the plurality voting rule when parameterized by the budget of the players. Our contributions directly address a direction suggested by \[[@CR5]\]. In particular, we obtain the following results:

Theorem 1 {#FPar1}
---------

The [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} and [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} problems are W\[2\]-hard and W\[1\]-hard, respectively, when parameterized by the budget of the defender, and are FPT when parameterized by the number of districts.

Theorem 2 {#FPar2}
---------

The [PV-Man]{.smallcaps} and [PD-Man]{.smallcaps} problems are W\[1\]-hard when parameterized by the budget of the attacker (even when the defender budget is zero), and are FPT when parameterized by the number of voters.

Our results rely on reductions from traditional problems such as [Multi-Colored Clique]{.smallcaps} and [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps}. Our hardness results work even when the input is specified in unary. It is reasonably natural to imagine that these parameters would be small in practice, since they correspond to real-world budget constraints. To that end, our results here bring mixed news: on the one hand, the hardness of mounting an attack may be viewed as a positive outcome, but on the other hand, it turns out that the problem of optimally reversing damages is hard as well. This triggers the natural question of whether the recounting problem admits good approximations when treated as an optimization problem, either on the criteria of the budget or on the criteria of the quality of the winning candidate that we are able to restore. The FPT algorithms that we present rely mostly on straightforward enumeration, and it would be interesting to improve the running times in question.

*Related Work.* While we build most closely on the work of Elkind et al. \[[@CR5]\], and much of the work on manipulation in the literature of social choice does not consider the possibility of a counter-attack, we note that some recent investigations have been carried out in a spirit that is similar to our present contribution. Dey et al. \[[@CR3]\] also consider a parameterized approach to protecting elections, where the voting rule in question is the Condorcet rule. They build on the work of Yin et al. \[[@CR10]\], who study a pre-emptive approach to protecting elections. In these models, the defender allocates resources to guard some of the electoral districts, so that the votes there cannot be influenced, and the attacker responds afterward. This is in contrast to our setting, where the defender makes the second move. The social choice literature is rich in studies of manipluation, control, and bribery. For a detailed overview we direct the reader to the surveys \[[@CR1], [@CR6]\].

Preliminaries {#Sec2}
=============

We recall the setting from \[[@CR5]\]. We consider elections over a *candidate* set *C*, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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For PV and PD, we define the *social welfare* of a candidate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We now consider the scenario where an election may be manipulated by an attacker, who wants to change the result of the election in favor of his preferred candidate *p*. The attacker has a budget $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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After the attacker, a socially minded defender with budget $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We say that the attacker wins if he has a manipulation strategy such that after the defender moves optimally, the preferred candidate of attacker i.e. *p* wins. We define the following two decision problems based on voting rule $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Next we state the definitions and parameterized hardness results for decision problems that are used throughout this paper, and refer the reader to \[[@CR2], [@CR4]\] for a detailed introduction to parameterized complexity and the framework of parameterized reductions.

[Dominating Set]{.smallcaps}: A set of vertices *D* is a dominating set in graph *G* if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$V (G) = N_G[D]$$\end{document}$. [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps} asks that given a graph *G* and a non-negative integer *k*, does there exist a dominating set of size at most *k*? [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps} is known to be W\[2\]-hard parameterized by *k* \[[@CR4]\].[Multi-Colored Clique]{.smallcaps}: Given a graph *G* and a partition of the vertex set *V* into *k* color classes $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Plurality over Voters (PV) {#Sec3}
==========================

In this section, we analyze the parameterized complexity of [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} and [PV-Man]{.smallcaps} with different parameters. It is easy to see that [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} is FPT when parameterized by the number of districts (*k*), since we may guess the districts to be recounted. Since $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k \le n$$\end{document}$, the problem is also FPT parameterized by the number of voters.

Proposition 1 {#FPar3}
-------------

[PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} is FPT when parameterized by the no. of districts *k* or the number of voters *n*.

We now show that [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} is W\[2\]-hard when parameterized by budget of the defender ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\textsc {B}_\mathcal {D}$$\end{document}$). Before describing the construction formally, we briefly outline the main idea. We reduce from the [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps}, which is well-known to be W\[2\]-hard parameterized by the size of the solution, which we denote by *k*. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(G = (V,E), k)$$\end{document}$ be an instance of [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps}. We create an instance of [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps} where we have candidates and districts corresponding to vertices of *G*, along with a special candidate *w* who is our desired winner. To begin with, we have an "immutable" district---one where the original and manipulated votes are identical---that sets the baseline score of the special candidate at *n*. The number votes for any other candidate *c* from this district is fixed to ensure that the total number of votes for *c* is *also* *n*. In a district corresponding to a vertex *v*, every candidate corresponding to a vertex $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$u \in N[v]$$\end{document}$ gets one vote. In the original scenario, all voters in these districts vote only for some dummy candidates. The key is that a "switch" in a district corresponding to a vertex *v* *reduces* the vote count for all vertices in *N*\[*v*\]. Since *w* receives no votes from any of the other districts, observe that the only way for *w* to emerge as a unique winner is if all of the other candidates *lose* votes from the switches. It is not hard to infer from here that the defender has a valid switching strategy if and only if *G* has a dominating set of size at most *k*.

Lemma 1 {#FPar4}
-------
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                \begin{document}$$\textsc {B}_\mathcal {D}$$\end{document}$, the defender's budget.

Proof {#FPar5}
-----

We present an FPT reduction from the [Dominating Set]{.smallcaps} problem. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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**Districts:** We introduce a *baseline* district $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$d_v$$\end{document}$. We also have a *special* candidate *w*.

**Voting Outcomes:** The voting outcomes are as follows. For ease of presentation, let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The special candidate does not receive any votes from the primary districts in either the original or the manipulated settings. In particular, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathbf{v }}_{\mathcal {D}_v,c_u} = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 &{}\quad \text {if }u \in N_G[v] \\ 0 &{}\quad \text {otherwise}\\ \end{array}\right. }$$\end{document}$$In the original election, a dummy candidate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$d(u)+1$$\end{document}$ in the primary district corresponding to *u*, and a score of zero everywhere else. Formally, $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf{v} _{\mathcal {D}_v,d_{u}} = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} d(v)+1 &{}\quad \text {if u = v}\\ 0 &{}\quad \text {otherwise}\\ \end{array}\right. }$$\end{document}$$The dummy candidates receive no votes in the primary districts in the manipulated elections.In the baseline district, the score of the main candidates is defined to ensure that their total score in the manipulated election is *N*. In particular, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathbf{v }}_{\mathcal {D}_0,c_v} = \mathbf{v} _{\mathcal {D}_0,c_v} = N - (d (v) + 1)$$\end{document}$.The dummy candidates receive no votes in the baseline district in both the original and manipulated elections.The score of *w* is *N* in the baseline district in both the original and manipulated elections. In particular, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathbf{v }}_{\mathcal {D}_0,w} = \mathbf{v} _{\mathcal {D}_0,w} = N$$\end{document}$.

To summarize, the primary districts corresponding to a vertex *v* have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$d(v) + 1$$\end{document}$ voters, and all main candidates corresponding to vertices in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$N_G[v]$$\end{document}$ get one vote each in the manipulated world; while the dummy candidate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$d_v$$\end{document}$ gets all the votes in the original world. Observe that in the manipulated election, all the candidates except the dummy candidates have a total score of *N*, while the dummy candidates have a score of zero.
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                \begin{document}$$= k$$\end{document}$. The preferred candidate is *w*. We also work with the following tie-breaking order: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ldots c_{v} \ldots \succ w \succ \ldots d_{vu} \ldots ,$$\end{document}$ where the main candidates are preferred over the special candidate, but the special candidate dominates the dummy candidates. This completes the description of the constructed instance. Due to lack of space, we defer the proof of equivalence to a full version \[[@CR8]\] of this paper.    $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We now turn our attention to [PV-Man]{.smallcaps}. First, we prove that [PV-Man]{.smallcaps} is FPT parameterized by the number of voters. This follows by first observing that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$m \le 2n$$\end{document}$ without loss of generality, since at most 2*n* candidates can have a non-trivial score across the original and manipulated instances combined, and the remaining candidates are irrelevant to the instance. The algorithm can then proceed by guessing a manipulation strategy---note that the space of all possible strategies is bounded once the candidates are bounded---and then invoking the [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} algorithm from the previous section as a subroutine to verify the validity of the guessed strategy. Thus, we have the following.

Proposition 2 {#FPar6}
-------------

[PV-Man]{.smallcaps} is FPT parameterized by *n*, the number of voters.

We now show that [PV-Man]{.smallcaps} is W\[1\]-hard parameterized by budget of the attacker ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\textsc {B}_\mathcal {A}$$\end{document}$). Before describing the construction formally, we briefly outline the main idea. We reduce from the [Multi-Colored Clique]{.smallcaps} problem, which is well-known to be W\[1\]-hard parameterized by the number of color classes, which we denote by *k*. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(G = (V = V_1 \uplus \cdots \uplus V_k,E), k)$$\end{document}$ be an instance of [Multicolored-Clique]{.smallcaps}. In the reduced instance, we introduce a special candidate *w* who is the preferred candidate of the defender. The rival candidates are candidates corresponding to color classes $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$c_v$$\end{document}$. We also introduce some *dummy* candidates. We introduce districts corresponding to each $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$e\in E$$\end{document}$. Also, there exists a special district which is "immutable", which sets up the initial scores of all candidates such that they are equal to a large number (say *F*). Initially, *w* has 0 votes. The scores are set up in such a way that the attacker has to transfer votes of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Note that apart from the above, the dummy candidates get 1 vote each, and the special candidate *w* has 0 votes. Also, the attacker has no room to manipulate in the baseline district, that is, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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**Reverse Direction.** In the reverse direction, we essentially argue that any valid solution must resemble the structure of the solution that we obtained while demonstrating the forward direction. This follows from the construction, and due to lack of space, the details are deferred to a full version \[[@CR8]\] of this paper.    $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Plurality over Districts (PD) {#Sec4}
=============================

In this section, we analyze the parameterized complexity of [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} and [PD-Man]{.smallcaps}. As with [PV-Rec]{.smallcaps}, it is easy to see that [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} is also FPT when parameterized by the number of districts (*k*), since we may guess the districts to be recounted. Since $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$n \ge k$$\end{document}$, it is also FPT parameterized by the number of voters.

Proposition 3 {#FPar9}
-------------

[PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} is FPT when parameterized by the number of districts *k* or the number of voters *n*.

We now show that [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} is W\[1\]-hard parameterized by budget of the defender $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Lemma 3 {#FPar10}
-------

[PD-Rec]{.smallcaps} is W\[1\]-hard parameterized by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\textsc {B}_\mathcal {D}$$\end{document}$, the defender's budget.

Proof {#FPar11}
-----
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Note that the voting outcome in the baseline districts is the same in the original and manipulated settings. It only remains to specify explicitly the weights of the baseline districts. We let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _w := (n+1)k + 6m$$\end{document}$. Recall that this is the weight of the baseline district corresponding to the special candidate. For any non-dummy candidate *c*, let *s*(*c*) be its score from the manipulated districts. We then set $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We enforce the following tie-breaking order: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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This completes the description of the constructed instance. We defer the proof of equivalence to a full version \[[@CR8]\] of this paper due to lack of space.    $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We now turn our attention to [PD-Man]{.smallcaps}. We observe that [PD-Man]{.smallcaps} can be shown to be W\[1\]-hard by a reduction from [PD-Rec]{.smallcaps}. We briefly sketch the main idea: to begin with, we switch the roles of the manipulated profiles and the original ones, set the defender budget to zero and the attacker budget to the defender budget. We would also set up the votes in the districts to be such that the only meaningful manipulation by the attacker is to move the manipulated profile to the original one. The equivalence is based on repurposing a recounting strategy to an attacking one and vice-versa. We defer the details of this argument to a full version \[[@CR8]\] of the paper.

Concluding Remarks {#Sec5}
==================

Our main contribution was to settle the parameterized complexity for the problems of recounting and manipulation when parameterized by the player budgets, for both the PD and PV implementations of the plurality voting rules. We also observed that these problems are FPT when parameterized by the number of voters, and that the recounting problem is FPT when parameterized by the number of districts as well.

We make some remarks about directions for future work. In the setting of succinct input, the problems of recounting and manipulation are already para-NP-hard because of the NP-completeness for three candidates. When the votes are specified in unary is an interesting direction for future work. The dynamic programming algorithm proposed by \[[@CR5]\] already shows that the problem is in XP, parameterized by the number of candidates, and we leave open the issue of whether the problem is FPT. The problem of manipulation parameterized by the number of districts is another unresolved case. More broadly, it would be interesting to challenge the theoretical hardness results obtained here against heuristics employed on real world data sets. The issue of identifying and working with structural parameters is also an interesting direction for further thought.
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